Any risk analysis of a large infrastructure that does not account for external dependencies is dangerously introspective. A top-down, goal-to-dependencies modeling approach can capture interdependencies and allow supplychain entities to securely share risk data, calculate the likely impact of a failure, and respond accordingly.
I
n the st century, individuals, groups, and enterprises alike depend on a combination of private and public entities to provide basic and critical services, such as telecommunications, energy, transportation, human resources, and governance. Other entities might in turn depend on them, forming a supply chain. This results in a complex system, within which entities often operate autonomously, at di erent geographical locations, and possibly with no overarching authority to facilitate coordination. Such complexity often results in an entity being unaware of its dependences or of the full range of other entities that depend on it. In short, it cannot collate the risks associated with its supply chain.
Risk assessments undertaken using enterprise riskassessment methodologies (including ISO/IEC Standard , CRAMM [CCTA Risk Analysis and Management Method], and Octave ) de ne risk for individual entities in complex systems and are often carried out introspectively. A hospital's risk assessment, for example, might evaluate sta availability, medical equipment, records management systems, data communication networks, power stations, datacenters, and transport infrastructures, to name a few. Some of these entities, such as sta and medical equipment, are self-provisioned. A hospital can determine the risk for these self-provisioned entities because it knows what it takes to ensure an adequate number of sta and operational equipment. But other resources are provided by external entities, outside the hospital's control. The risk of external resources being unavailable is unknown because the hospital does not
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comprehensively understand the elements they depend on. However, the external entity might be aware of such risks because it could have performed its own risk assessment.
The problem in such scenarios is that the two risk models (the hospital and the external entity) are unconnected; the principal and external entities do not share risk data even though they are e ectively part of the same complex system. Thus, entities are interdependent because they are vulnerable to the failure of elements not directly included in their individual risk models. Yet, the failure of an external entity's elements can trigger a rapid, unanticipated, and catastrophic cascade of repercussions to other, nominally separate principal entities. The role of interdependencies means that, for the purpose of risk analysis, it makes sense to regard many notionally distinct entities as parts of a larger complex system.
Interdependencies mean that static one-o risk assessments of isolated entities are insu cient when attempting to manage risk within and between notionally distinct systems. Isolated models need to be linked, somehow, to build a risk model of a complex system. Yet, linking introspective risk models from distributed entities is nontrivial. First, linking models requires that we identify elements that are common to both models. Second, determining the dependency risk requires an understanding of the common elements' dependencies. Most existing risk-modeling methods use a bottom-up approach-from failure to consequence-that attempts to answer this question: What could go wrong? This is a subjective view of risk that might not allow us to recognize dependencies and unpredicted circumstances. Finding elements common to multiple independent risk models is extremely di cult because it focuses on independent failure modes rather than common objectives.
To address this challenge, we propose a di erent question: What does the element depend on to be successful? When we use this approach to model an entity's risk, at some point the dependency on an external entity emerges. Working from the top down in this way-that is, from a complex system's goals to its dependencies-lets us quickly determine failure modes in the event of failure anywhere in the complex system. This amounts to repeatedly answering the original questionWhat does the element depend on to be successful?-across multiple isolated models. The di erence is subtle but important and is equivalent to traversing a tree recursively from the trunk (top down), which generates all the branches, versus tracing a path from a given branch to the trunk (bottom up), which generates only one path.
The top-down, goal-oriented modeling approach we describe here enables analysts to identify which dependencies their goals are most sensitive to, thereby enabling a prioritized risk-management strategy with informed investment and allocation of countermeasures; identify the most likely sources of failure given an actual or assumed failure within the entity, e ciently identifying the problem and returning the system to full operation; and identify other autonomously managed entities on which it depends. We can render these determinations more accessible by using Bayesian methods and failure-mode analyses.
Our risk-modeling paradigm provides both a statistical assessment of various de nitions of risk and a real-time representation of the current status of all the entities in the model. We address the inherent scaling problem of handling potentially large complex systems by introducing a distributed middleware and supporting service-oriented architecture that simpli es model construction and facilitates the sharing of realtime functional status data between principal and external entities.
MODELING DEPENDENCIES WITHIN COMPLEX SYSTEMS
Our proposed dependency modeling (DM) approach determines an enterprise's risk using a graphical model. In this discussion, enterprise denotes the providing entity under consideration or its owner, be it a government, business, or group.
The method for building a top-down model of an enterprise begins by identifying an overall goal and its rstlevel dependencies (see Figure ) . We then determine the next-level dependencies, and so on. Dependencies are assigned a number of possible states (failure or success being the simplest) and a conditional probability of being in those states. Repeating these steps for subprocesses produces a tree or graph-based model.
For the sake of brevity, we will not go into technical speci cs here, but this model can be interpreted both as dep dep goal dep FIGURE . Goal with fi rst-level dependencies. Identifying a goal and its fi rst-level dependencies is the fi rst step in building a top-down enterprise model. The subsequent step is to determine the next-level dependencies. Each goal can also function as a dependency of one or more elements drawn to its left.
a Bayesian network and as a failuremode model. 5, 6 A Bayesian analysis engine uses the probabilities to determine a range of sensitivities or vulnerabilities that illustrate which elements in the model are most pivotal to its success, and a mode analyzer intuitively illustrates the model's most likely cause of failure, given that a hypothetical (for simulation purposes) or actual (for response purposes) failure has occurred. Individual models can be created for a number of providing entities owned by an individual enterprise. These can then be linked and scaled to model the entire enterprise. Lastly, the enterprise model can be linked to interdependent entities within other enterprises to build a complex system model using a scale-management method we call zooming. Loosely speaking, risk is about failing to achieve goals. Thus, goals are central to the enterprise model. In DM terms, risk in complex systems relates to achieving, or failing to achieve, the provision of the fully functioning entities that goals depend upon. We refer to the successful provision as a goal. Without a goal there is no risk, and changing goals alters the threat landscape.
Every element in a dependency model is an abstract goal. In other words, we are not interested in having an access control system (ACS) for its own sake; rather, we want to keep hackers out of the network. It quickly becomes clear that all goals are abstract in this sense. Having an ACS does not necessarily achieve the goal. Successfully defending a system depends on a number of factors, including technology (such as an ACS), expert knowledge (how to configure the ACS), and people (abiding by the expected security policy). Simply requiring the existence of an ACS leads to a box-ticking riskmanagement approach, which is unlikely to see the goal achieved.
Each element in the model can be regarded as a goal with dependencies that are drawn to its right (see Figure 1) . Those elements can also function as a dependency of one or more elements drawn to its left. The model can be extended in this way, and for the purpose of the model, the process can be terminated at any stage by merely regarding some elements as being external entities with unknown dependencies. Examples of the latter might include the reliability of a public utility or a supply of clean water. We call these elements uncontrollables, and all we need to know about them is their statistical properties to feed into the Bayesian engine when the model is complete. Ultimately, much of the risk in complex systems springs from these uncontrollables.
ANALYZING THE MODEL
Bayesian network literature often describes relationships using a dynastic metaphor. 5, 6 In this context, our dependencies would be called the parents of goals, and our goals the children of dependencies. Thus, our model can be used to determine failure modes, and if we include conditional probability tables (CPTs), it can be treated as a Bayesian network, wherein a Bayesian analyzer can determine the probability that each element will be in each possible state.
To make Bayesian inferences, we need to know the statistical relationships between a parent and child. The degree to which a goal is achieved is expressed as the goal element's state. Each element can have any number of possible states greater than one. A common number is two, typically associated with failure and success, although it is sometimes convenient to have more. A power station, for example, could provide varying levels of supply. In accordance with the success-mode concept, we label states according to some value judgment. Typical names for state pairs are bad/good, failure/success, red/ green, no/yes, or 0/1.
If we incorporate real-time updating (via sensor data collected via an Internet of Things model, for example), DM can provide a "living" risk model, where the impact of state changes is immediately reflected in the rest of the model. For example, we could determine the cost-effectiveness of introducing a countermeasure to reduce risk or experiment with various economies to identify one that entails the least additional risk.
A CPT expresses the relationship between a goal and its parents by listing the probability of that goal being in each state based on its parents' states. If the parent-child relationship boils down to a logical AND/OR function, the CPT has a simple structure consisting of 0s and 1s, but more subtle relationships can be accommodated. If the goal is an uncontrollable, then in an isolated model this table is simply a list of the probabilities it will be in each possible state. The power of DM for complex systems becomes clear when the states of uncontrollables are dynamically pulled into the model from other distributed models that contain the actual states and dependencies of these uncontrollables.
COMPARISON WITH OTHER MODELING APPROACHES
A brief introduction to traditional risk-modeling techniques is available in earlier work, 7 and several reviews of risk assessment in critical complex systems exist. Enterprise risk-assessment methods work by defining a list of assets, determining their vulnerabilities, assigning threats to those vulnerabilities, and calculating the impact of a threat that exploits a vulnerability. Still, the dependencies between assets and the impact of attacks on the rest of the enterprise have received little attention. To some extent, the ISO/IEC 31000:2009 standard 16 has begun to address this by framing risks in a goaloriented manner, but it does not fully account for dependencies. We can use fault, event, or attack trees to identify the potential faults, events, or attacks that could cause a complex system to fail. Cause-effect diagrams and CORAS threat models also proceed from failure to potential cause and subsequent effect. These are all, in principle, graph-theoretic modeling approaches, with nodes and edges representing how elements depend on one other. Our approach is broadly related to the same type of graph. If we add probability data to the graph, a Bayesian analyzer can interpret these approaches as well as our proposed method. The key difference between our modeling approach and previous work is our focus on achieving goals (top down) and not the likely causes of failure (bottom up).
Because various authors have used the terms "bottom up" and "top down" to mean different things, let's begin by defining them in the context of defining risk. The bottom-up, faultoriented approach that works from cause to impact introduces the following difficulty: the failure of a simple element (such as a bolt coming loose) could ultimately lead, via a set of interdependencies, to the failure of, say, a major power station. Methods such as fault and event trees let us model this risk, tracking the failure of successive subsystems from the loose bolt to the failure of the entire power station. Although this is easy to understand and logical, the loose bolt is just one of thousands of events that could cause the power station to fail. It could fail as a result of industrial action in its fuel supply chain, a European Union directive restricting fossil fuel use, or an aircraft crashing into a distribution network. This question then arises: Why would we focus on a loose bolt? In other words, this approach is restricted to investigating only the avenues that occur to us when we carry out the analysis, so it could fail to include critical factors and thereby fail to span the relevant domain of causality.
By contrast, a top-down, goaloriented approach corresponds to recursively expanding branches from the trunk outward in an effort to generate an entire tree. As a loose analogy, a bottom-up approach is like checking a bicycle tire's inner tube for a slow leak by examining suspect areas with a magnifying glass, whereas a top-down approach fills the inner tube with water and checks for bubbles.
LINKING ISOLATED RISK MODELS AND SHARING RISK DATA
As we explained earlier, dependency models help identify external entities on which an enterprise depends. They also help establish critical dependencies, an enterprise's most sensitive entities that are critical to its success. After we have identified these pivotal dependencies, we can in turn investigate them by examining their dependencies using the zooming process. This could be a continual cycle, where multiple zooms create a model of interdependent systems across an infrastructure.
This can be a powerful tool when considering complex supply chains. In reality, however, an enterprise owner will be unlikely to share all its dependency data with other parties, and centralizing such information poses its own security risk. Thus, our proposed system assumes that the external entities in a complex system are only willing to share a limited view of their dependency data, and data access is determined by case-specific requirements. That is, if an enterprise depends on an external entity, the enterprise owner can periodically request access to state data from the external entity's model. If it obtains the data, the enterprise owner can incorporate the current state into its own model.
To protect against attacks by hostile parties attempting to discover system vulnerabilities, our proposed system stores, manages, and distributes the data embodying models using enterprise-based, fine-grained access control. Each entity's data is stored and managed by the enterprise owning the entity. Parties can gain access to it using a network connection, the URL for which is securely managed and distributed based on access restrictions defined by the enterprise. We recommend that the URL point to a disaster-resilient endpoint, such as a mirrored site or secure datacenter at a separate geographical location. Thus, if the entity should succumb to a major
AS CYBER-TERRORISM BECOMES A GREATER THREAT, WE NEED TO FOCUS ON PREREQUISITES FOR SUCCESS RATHER THAN ON WHAT MIGHT FAIL.
incident, the data will still be retrievable even if the original location is destroyed. This approach also helps manage the scaling problems involved with handling large model data, as the complexity of such data will grow roughly exponentially with depth.
After creating a model, an enterprise stores it in a secured Internetaccessible location with an associated URI and then allows other enterprises limited access to parts of the model. The dependency model consists of a number of goals, each of which has an automatically created globally unique identifier (GUID). The state and probability data for each goal is thus individually discoverable. If an ana lysis requires data regarding an external entity, the analyst can contact that entity's owner using an agreed-upon protocol and request access to the data for the goals on which they depend. For example, if a hospital depends on an electronic patient-admission service that is remotely hosted, it can contact the hosting enterprise and request access to the data that represents the following goal: the correct functioning of a patient-admissions service. The external entity can grant access to that specific goal but not the rest of its model. Of course, the negotiation could include access to the goal dependencies, whatever depth is desired and permitted. The negotiation of access to goal states and the associated competition and political ramifications are outside this article's scope. Presently, we consider only the technical aspects of enabling the secure sharing of state data from dependency models.
The URIs (including GUIDs) of goals that are the subject of sharing agreements are automatically pushed to a global goal registry (see Figure  2 ), which contains a list of unique goal identifiers and URIs pointing to the network-addressable endpoint to which queries about a goal's state can be directed. Once an external entity agrees to share model data, the dependent entity creates a goal in its local dependency model and attaches its state information to the remote dependency's URI. To populate the state information, the local model sends a request for that goal's status to a distributed query engine (DQE; see Figure 2 ). A DQE exists within each enterprise that agrees to share its model data. Acting in client mode, the enterprise sends requests for goal status to a DQE acting in server mode at remote sites. Thus, data requesters also act as data providers, similar to service providers in real-world complex systems. The state and probability data is returned to the requester (via a secure cryptographic protocol) and added to the goal in the local model. If the state differs from the one already in the model, the model is updated to reflect the state change. This provides a current view of how failure within a remote system affects a local system and enables interdependencies within a complex system to be continually updated. The goal registry can be pinged periodically to request the location of state and probability data for external goals. In an emergency situation, such requests could occur every few seconds.
CASE STUDY
To illustrate our method, we use an example with two isolated dependency models: a hospital and a datacenter. The latter hosts and provides the electronic admissions service for the former. We demonstrate how to discover external dependencies within an isolated model and then show how to merge the two models.
In our example, the datacenter hosts the hospital's patient-admissions service at a different geographical location. Figure 3a shows a snippet of the datacenter's dependency model. "Systems OK" indicates the correct functioning of the IT systems hosted by the datacenter. The hospital has performed its own risk assessment and produced its own dependency model, which is partially shown in Figure 3b . In the hospital's dependency model, "IT Systems OK" includes a dependency "Admission System OK," which indicates that the electronic patientadmission system is available and functioning correctly. This is an external dependency, provided by the datacenter. Therefore, "Systems OK" and "Admission System OK" are one and the same. Although they have been
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Distributed query engine (DQE) FIGURE 2. Distributed model zooming. A global goal registry can be pinged periodically to request the location of state and probability data for external goals.
given different names by their modelers, discussions between the two enterprises will establish that this goal is the common element in both models. Using the distributed data-sharing method we described in the last section, we can add a reference to the actual goal-state data, which is stored and managed in the external dependency model. Via the DQE, we can mine the current status data for "Systems OK" from the remotely stored model, update the hospital model, and identify any changes.
A real-world example can help us show how unexpected events can impact complex systems. Consider the Buncefield incident, where a series of explosions at a major oil storage facility in England caused a nearby business park to burn down. 17 A datacenter in that business park provided the electronic patient-admissions system for a hospital 50 miles away. At the time, there was no way to gauge the impact this would have on the hospital's admission system. With our approach, an analysis of the datacenter could have quickly determined which of the goals within the model had failed. The cause of failure is not important at this point. However, by informing the dependencies of the failure, the risk model can be updated and appropriate action can be quickly taken. One of the failed goals would be "Systems OK." The hospital would periodically be using the DQE to query the state of its dependencies, which would obtain a response from the data center model that "Systems OK" had a success probability of 0. The DM software would immediately change the goal's state in the hospital's model, so the impact would be discovered instantly. Figure 4a shows the hospital model again, this time with a success probability scale. "IT Systems OK" has a success probability of 0.45, and the other goals are in their current state.
If we change the success probability of "Admission System OK" to 0-that is, we assume the DQE has updated the model following the incident-we can see in Figure 4b that the "IT systems OK" goal now also has a success probability of 0 because the failure of a critical dependency impacts its success. This update is instant following an external entity's failure.
P
rior to the work we describe here, it was not common practice to join risk models and share functional status data such that a change in an external entity's status could be immediately incorporated into its dependencies' models. Existing work in vulnerability and sensitivity analysis is capable of producing probability statistics and likely causes of failure within complex systems, but existing risk analyses are only designed to handle preconceived 3 . Case study dependency models: (a) partial datacenter dependency model and (b) partial hospital dependency model. "IT Systems OK" and "Admission System OK" are common elements in the two dependency models, as both indicate that the electronic patient-admission system is available and functioning correctly.
failures. The potential causes of failure change constantly, and as cyberterrorism becomes a greater threat, it is valuable to focus on prerequisites for success rather than on what might fail; the goal is to generate the entire dependency tree rather than generate isolated routes from failure to consequence. Taking a goal-oriented view of risk enables such coverage, whereas a failure-oriented view can lead to overlooked threats, static outdated risk models, and a myopic picture of vulnerabilities. The ability to evaluate the likelihood of a foreseen event fails to address unforeseen threats. A top-down approach builds models that span the entire causal domain and hence finds and evaluates all threats, not just those the model writer thought of at the time of analysis. A more detailed technical description of the method we describe here is available in the Open Group's Dependency Modeling (O-DM) standard, which was co written by the authors of this article. FIGURE 4. Probability table for the hospital model (a) before and (b) after the "admissions system failure" state.
